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TAXING DISTRIBUTIONS PURSUANT TO CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS*
William M. Emeryt
implies that we are concerned with the tax
problems of the stockholder rather than those of the corporation. And while one corporation may be the stockholder of another,
my emphasis will be primarily upon stockholders who are individuals,
including, of course, trusts and estates who are taxed as individuals.
A stockholder who makes an exchange or receives a distribution in
connection with a corporate reorganization faces one or a combination
of these possibilities:
(I) There may be no immediate effect upon his ~ liability.
Any gain or loss is not recognized under section 112, but the tax consequences are deferred until the newly received property, or the balance of his old stock or securities, is disposed of in a taxable transaction.
While we frequently refer to such transactions as "tax-free" or "taxexempt," it should always be kept in mind that we are not dealing with
a tax exemption, but rather with deferment of tax. It is also to be kept
in mind that losses as well as gains are deferred.
(2) Some or all of what the taxpayer receives in the transaction
may be taxed as capital gain.
(3) Some or all of what he receives may be taxed as an ordinary
dividend.1
I need not elaborate upon the widely varying tax liabilities dependent upon these alternatives.
These reorganizations and recapitalizations are transactions well
out of the ordinary course of business and are frequently of major
importance from the standpoint of the corporation and its stockholders.
The stockholder may be exchanging stock or securities representing
his entire interest in the corporation for new stock or securities of the
same corporation or of a different corporation. If gain is recognized it
will be based upon the present fair market value of what he receives,
less his cost for what he turns in. This gain may represent an appre"DISTRIBUTIONS"

,. Paper delivered at the Institute on the Taxation of Business Enterprise, sponsored
by the University of Michigan Law School, June 25-28, 1951.-Ed.
t Member, Illinois Bar.-Ed.
1 Another possibility is that gain or loss is not recognized at the time because the
property received by the stockholder has no fair market value, a subject which is outside
the scope of this discussion.
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ciation in value accrued over many years. Or the stockholder may be
receiving new stock or securities representing the bulk of the present
value of his holdings, with the value of the old stock that he retains
being correspondingly diminished. In a great many of the situations
that have come to litigation, closely held corporations are involved, and
it is the reorganization or recapitalization of such corporations that
tends to give rise to most of our current questions. In many of these
situations, his interest in the corporation represents the bulk of the
stockholder's fortune. Even at capital gain rates, a tax imposed upon
such a profit may be grievously burdensome, particularly since the
recognized gain may still be only a "paper profit." If this profit is taxed
as an ordinary dividend, surtax rates being what they are, the result
may be financial ruin. If we think of a tax determination as a contest
of wits, the game at this table is for extremely high stakes.
·
It follows that corporate recapitalizations or reorganizations are not
to be lightly undertaken. They require the most careful scrutiny by the
corporate officers, the stock and security holders, and their advisers.
In sections 203 and 204 of the Revenue Act of 1924, elaborating
upon rudimentary provisions in the 1921 act [sections 202(c) to (e)],
Congress adopted the basic provisions now found in sections 112
and l 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. It was generally believed that
the purpose of these initjal provisions was to prescribe a set of definite
rules that could be understood and followed, both by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and by taxpayers. For some years this was done.
But over the past ten to fifteen years there has been a series of developments, spurred by a number of Supreme Court decisions, so that today
one must go far beyond the statute to ascertain what one can or cannot
do without serious tax penalty.
Administration spokesmen, and sometimes the courts, lay the blame
for this development at the taxpayer's doorstep. They speak with some
heat of attempts to cloak what are essentially sales and dividends under
the guise of reorganizations, and of elaborate procedures within the
language but not the "spirit" of section ll2. Taxpayers and their representatives can speak, with equal feeling, of opportunism by revenue
agents and conferees, and of their urge to impose tax, which often
seems as strong as that of a taxpayer to avoid it. They, too, can stress
the equities or the technicalities, as it suits their purpose. Since the
bureau policy has long been to devote the most attention to the returns
of larger taxpayers, and since the potential tax liabilities are generally
large, any such urge on the part of a tax administrator has ample scope
in the reorganization field.
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However, it is not my purpose to debate the cause of this development. Rather, it is to face the situation as it has now developed, pausing only to note that the statutory provisions are only a point of departure. New concepts, by way of both restriction and extension, have
been deliberately engrafted on the statute. These are hinted at but not
fully outlined in the Treasury regulations, with their talk of inherent
and underlying assumptions.
The term "corporate reorganizations" implies a transaction within
the general scope, or at least shooting distance, of sections 112 and 113.
I assume we are all generally familiar with the language of these provisions. Transactions in this field take many forms and have many
objectives. For convenience, we can consider in tum several major
reorganization patterns. The simplest of these, making it our best
starting point, is the recapitalization. Distribution problems in conne'ction with recapitalizations find substantial parallels through all the other
major reorganization patterns.
Corporate Recapitalizations

Unlike other types of reorganization, a recapitalization is not defined in the statute, and its nature is only partially indicated by examples in the regulations. 2 The Supreme Court has recently expressly
refused to state its definition, preferring to approach it by the process
of including or excluding each situation as it arises. 3 This process may
be the most satisfactory from a judicial standpoint, but it gives little
assistance to the taxpayers who have a legitimate interest in a reasonable
estimate of their tax liabilities before entering into a specific transaction.
For present purposes we may take as a rough definition of a recapitalization a rearrangement of the financial structure of a single corporation, affecting either the stock or the indebtedness, or both.
The pertinent statutory provision is section 112(b)(3) providing
that no gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation, a party to a reorganization, are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization. For the
moment, we may disregard the last clause, since even a closely affiliated
corporation is not a party to the recapitalization of its affiliate. 4 We are
2Treas. Reg. 111, §29.112(g)-2.
a Bazley v. Commissioner, 332 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947).
4 F. T. Bedford, 2 T.C. 1189 (1943), affd. on another ground (2d Cir. 1945) 150
F. (2d) 341.
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also, of course, concerned with section 112(g)(l) which, under clause
(E), includes a recapitalization as a reorganization.
From the stockholder's standpoint, the transaction with which we
are concerned is an exchange of all or part of his old stock or securities
for new stock or securities of the same corporation.
(I) The Fully Qualifying Exchange. If the statutory requirements, written and implied, are met, the individual's paper gain or loss,
no matter how large it may be, will not be recognized for tax purposes.
The cost or other statutory basis of his old stock or securities will be
equitably apportioned to the new stock or securities. This result will
follow even though the exchange may have some of the attributes of
a distribution.
For example, suppose old common stock is exchanged for new
common stock ·of greater par or stated value, the difference representing
a capitalization of earnings. It is not necessary to stand upon the constitutional limitations affecting stock dividends specified by Eisner v.
Macomber, 5 or the alternative theory of statutory construction advanced
in Helvering v. Griffiths,6 or upon the simple provision of section
112(b)(2), since this exchange seems fully protected by sections
112(b)(3) and (g)(l)(E).
Likewise, the excess received by the stockholder may represent the
satisfaction of dividend arrearages. Numerous cases assert that this is
a nontaxable exchange. 7 And where bonds are turned in for new bonds
or stock, the issuance of stock or stock purchase warrants in lieu of
accrued interest on tlie bonds is not taxable. 8

(2) The Exchange That Does Not Qualify. On the other hand,
if the statutory requirements are not met, there is an immediate taxable
252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189 (1920).
318 U.S. 371; 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943).
7 Morainville v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1943) 135 F. (2d) 201; Okonite Co. v.
Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 248, cert. den. 329 U.S. 764, 67 S.Ct. 125
(1946); Thennoid Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 589; Skenandoa
Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 268, cert. den. 314 U.S. 696,
62 S.Ct. 413 (1941); South Atlantic Steamship Line, 42 B.T.A. 705 (1940); J. Weingarten, Inc., 44 B.T.A. 798 (1941), appeal dismissed (5th Cir. 1942); Knapp Monarch
Co., l T.C. 59 (1942), affd. on another issue (8th Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 863; GlobeNews Publishing Co., 3 T.C. 1199 (1944).
It appears necessary that the capitalization of dividend arrears be part of an exchange
involving the stock which gave rise to the arrearage. See Bedford v. Commissioner, (2d Cir.
1945) 150 F. (2d) 341, affg. 2 T.C. 1189 (1943).
A number of these cases dealt with the corporation's dividends paid credit, and it was
the government that contended that no taxable distribution was involved.
s Lenore Scullin Clark, 7 T.C. 192 (1946), affd. (8th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 677;
Wm. W. Carman, 13 T.C. 1029 (1949).
5

6
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event. In the more complicated reorganizations, it may be difficult to
meet the statutory definition of a reorganization or other statutory requirements. This does not frequently occur with recapitalizations,
since the statutory phrase is generally given broad scope, as indicated
by the foregoing examples. But a failure to meet the statutory requirements is still possible. For instance, what the taxpayer gives or receives
may not be a "stock or security," in the meaning of section l 12(b)(3).
The meaning of "stock" does not ordinarily present much of a problem.
"Securities" is another matter, since 1933 when the Supreme Court
made its first major qualification of section 112 in Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner,9 holding that short term purchase money
obligations were not "securities." This opened a field of controversy
that I will not attempt to discuss here, although the existence and importance of this question must not be ignored.
If there is such a failure,' the taxpayer is treated as if he had sold
his old stock or securities for a price equal to the fair market value of
what he receives, stock, securities, money or other property. His cost
of the old securities is deducted from this amount and the difference,
reB.ecting the appreciation in value, is recognized and taxable, although
represented solely by the new stock or securities, i.e., a paper profit.
In the simple case, where only new stock or securities of the same
corporation are received by the taxpayer, the profit so recognized will
be taxed as capital gain. But this relatively favorable tax treatment
cannot be taken for granted. There may be dividend possibilities, as
will appear from our later discussion.
(3) The Exchange With "Boot." Let us now assume that our
taxpayer turns in common stock in exchange for new stock plus cash
or a distribution in kind of some corporate property.
The tax consequences of this transaction are clearly outlined by the
statute. Had it not been for the money or other property, commonly
referred to as ''boot," this would have been a nontaxable exchange.
But where boot is involved, section l 12(c) comes into operation. Subsection (c)(l) provides that the gain, if any, shall be recognized, but
in an amount not in excess of the boot. But subsection (c)(2) provides
that if a distribution made in pursuance of a plan or reorganization,
otherwise within the scope of (c)(l), has the effect of a distribution of
a taxable dividend, then it shall be taxed as a dividend to the recipient.
When does a reorganization distribution "have the effect of a taxable dividend?" The first requirement is that the corporation have
9

287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct. 257 (1933).

554

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 50

earnings and profits available for distribution, since a "dividend" occurs
only when there are such earnings. In other words, the definition of a
"dividend" in section 115(a) is incorporated by reference in section
l 12(c)(2).10
If there are such earnings, dividend treatment under section
l 12(c)(2) is virtually automatic.11 There is no correspondence in the
decisions between these distributions and distributions in partial liquidation where section I 15(g) is in issue and where finespun distinctions
are often drawn.
A second limitation is found within section l 12(c)(2), namely,
that the amount taxable as a dividend thereunder shall not exceed the
amount of gain recognized under (c)(l). For example, if the taxpayer turns in stock that cost him $ I ,000 for new stock worth only $800
and cash of $300, his actual gain is only $100. Hence only this amount
should be taxed as a dividend under section l 12(c)(2), although cash
in a greater amount was received.
But in such a case the government might shift its ground and contend that this transaction was to be eyed from the viewpoint of section
I 15(g) as a distribution in partial liquidation. The results of this contention are difficult to predict. The question is whether section
l 12(c)(2) is to be given complete precedence over section l 15(g),
where the receipt of the boot cannot be segregated from the exchange
of stock for stock. In most cases, there is appreciation in value of the
taxpayer's holdings, and the over-all gain is greater than the amount of
the boot. In these cases it is uniformly held that dividend treatment
under section l 12(c)(2) supersedes the exchange treatment under
section l 15(c), the general provision relating to both complete and
partial liquidations.12 In these situations it is the taxpayer's ox that is
being gored.
10 Commissioner v. Estate of Edward T. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 1157 (1945).
Since a dividend under §l15(a) may result if the corporation has earnings during the
current taxable year, although it has no accumulated earnings at the time of the distribution, the extent to which a recapitalization distribution is taxable as a dividend may depend
upon the extent of earnings after the recapitalization but within the same taxable year.
11 Commissioner v. Estate of Edward T. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 1157
(1945); Love v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 236; Commissioner v. Forhan
Realty Corp., (2d Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 268; Commissioner v. Owens, (5th Cir. 1934)
69 F. (2d) 597.
12 Commissioner v. Estate of Edward T. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 1157
(1945); Love v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 236. The much-bandied
case of the Estate of Lewis, 6 T.C. 455 (1946), revd. (1st Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 839,
on remand 10 T.C. 1080 (1948), affd. (1st Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 646, where accumulated
earnings exceeded the actual gain, appears to have been decided upon the assumptions that
§112(c)(2), if applicable, supersedes §l15(c), and the dividend is to be limited to the
amount of the actual gain.
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Where there is a mixture of considerations on either end of the
exchange, can the taxpayer clarify the application of these provisions
by dividing the transaction into two or more steps? For instance, can
he exchange part of his stock solely for a new stock or security and
sell the balance of his old stock for the boot? In 1938 the Second Circuit said that he could; in 1946 they assured us, with equal positiveness, that he could not. In 1938 the Third Circuit adopted the former
view; in 1936 the Fourth Circuit expressed the latter view.13 We may
conclude that the attempt to segregate will be hazardous.
In considering boot cases, we tend to think primarily of boot received by our individual taxpayer. But suppose he is the one who gives
the boot. It does not seem to be settled whether this vitiates the entire
exchange, considering it as a single transaction, or whether the giving
of the boot can be considered as a separate exchange or the purchase
of an appropriate part of the new stock or securities.14
(4) The Upstream Exchange. Where no boot passes and only
stock or securities are involved on both ends of the exchange, so far as
it appears from the statutory language either a stock or a security may
be exchanged for either a stock or a security of an entirely different
nature. Thus the regulations recognize that common stock may be
turned in for preferred stock, and in reliance upon the statutory language a number of cases have held that preferred stock may be turned
in for debentures.11'
It will be noted that in each of these illustrations the taxpayer is
moving from a junior to a senior position within the capital and debt
structure of the corporation. For want of a better term, we can refer to
a move in this direction as an upstream exchange.· Where the taxpayer
starts with common stock, he may be converting part of his holdings to
18 Kelly v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 915; Spirella Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 908; United States v. Rodgers, (3d Cir. 1939) 102 F.
(2d) 335; Starr v. Commissioner, ( 4th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 964; Bedford v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 341.
Some of this conllict may be attributed to the ill-fated Dobson case, 321 U.S. 231, 64
S.Ct. 495 (1944).
14 The first approach was considered but decision on that ground was avoided in
Hoagland Corp. v. Helvering, (2d Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 962. In some cases recognition
of gain or loss on the boot might be deferred under §112(b)(5), dealing with transfers to
a controlled corporation, where the individual may tum in property of any nature for
stock or securities.
15Treas. Reg. 111, §29.112(g)-2. Clarence J. Schoo, 47 B.T.A. 459 (1942); Annis
Furs, Inc., 2 T.C. 1096 (1943). Edgar M. Docherty, 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942), approved
an exchange of common stock for debentures. In each instance the court found a proper
"business purpose" under tests which may no longer be fully applicable. It is necessary,
of course, that the debentures qualify as a security. L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 390.
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preferred stock or bonds, and his new or retained common stock will
leave him with the same proportionate share of the ultimate equity
interest in the corporation. In such cases he is moving toward a position where he can convert part of his interest into cash, applying a part
of his original cost to the stock or securities so converted, and hoping to
pay a tax limited to capital gain rates at the time of the conversion,
without any effect upon his proportionate share of the common stock
interest. He may expect to get the cash from the corporation itself,
through retirement of his new preferred stock or payment of his new
bonds.
If the newly acquired interest is a preferred stock, if and when it
is is retired by the corporation the taxpayer may face the danger of a
dividend under section 115(g). While the bureau may consider this
an imperfect weapon, it is by no means an impotent one. But if the
new interest is a bond or debenture, it requires a considerable stretching
of the language of-section I 15(g) to make it applicable when the obligation is paid.
Sharing the government's fear of tax avoidance in these situations,
the Supreme Court made a characteristic attack on this problem in the
Bazley and Adams cases.16 In both cases the stockholders of very closely
held corporations turned in their common stock for new common stock
and an issue of debentures. In one case surplus was capitalized. In the
other the debentures equaled a reduction in the authorized capital.
Both corporations had accumulated earnings in excess of the face
amount of the debentures. All the courts agreed (although not without dissents) that the debentures were taxable to the stockholders as
ordinary dividends.
The Supreme Court pitched its decision upon two grounds. The
second ground, having the appearance of an afterthought in the opinion, was that even if there was a reorganization exchange, the debentures would still be taxable as dividends under section l 12(c)(I) and
(2). In other words, they were boot, the implication being that they
were not securities within the meaning of section l 12(b)(3). In the
Bazley case, the Court emphasized that the debentures, although having a ten-year term, were callable at any time by the corporation, "which
in this case was the will of the taxpayer" who, with his wife, owned 99.9
16 Bazley v. Commissioner, and Adams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 332 U.S.
752, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947), affirming (3d Cir. 1945) 155 F. (2d) 237 (withdrawing a
prior opinion, 46-1 U.S.T.C. if9135), which affirmed 4 T.C. 897 (1945); also affirming
(3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 246, which affirmed 5 T.C. 351 (1945), superseding 4 T.C.
1186 (1945). Several days later, these decisions were applied in Heady v. Commissioner,
(7th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 699.
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per cent of the outstanding stock. This raises an interesting speculation
as to the extent that the classification of an indebtedness as a security
should depend upon whether the stock of the corporation is closely or
widely held. In the Adams case twenty year debentures without the
call feature were involved. It seems difficult to avoid classification of
such obligations as securities within a reasonable meaning of that term.
Perhaps here again the Court felt that the taxpayer, who owned practically all the outstanding stock, could control the time of payment. ·
Another interesting speculation is whether a minority stockholder, not
a member of the controlling family, should be taxed in the same fashion.
However, instead of pursuing these speculations, a more fruitful
source of discussion is found in the Court's first and major ground for
its decision. The lower court decisions had been based upon a lack of
''business purpose," harking back to Gregory v. Helvering,1 7 and attempting to draw a distinction between purposes of the corporation and
purposes of the stockholders. What the Supreme Court thought of this
approach is not clearly determinable. There are some intimations of
disapproval. But it sustained the ultimate conclusion of dividend taxation on a broader ground. After discussion of the purposes and assumptions underlying section l 12(g), the Court said:
"In the case of a corporation which has undistributed earnings, the creation of new corporate obligations which are transferred to stockholders in relation to their former holdings, so as to
produce, for all practical purposes, the same result as a distribution
of cash earnings of equivalent value, cannot obtain tax immunity
because cast in the form of a recapitalization-reorganization."18
The Court expressly declined to state its rule in narrower terms lest it
merely "challenge astuteness in evading it."19 The application and
implications of this rule are worthy of further consideration. Unlike
the Court, the taxpayer cannot lightly brush aside such inquiries. Assuming he is not a fool who leaps without looking ahead, his choice
lies between defining boundaries that the Court has declined to fix, or
foregoing what may be a legitimate and advantageous transaction.
Is the Bazley doctrine applicable only where the corporation is
closely held? This circumstance was stressed by the Supreme Court,
but even if it indicates an identifiable line of distinction, it seems unsafe
to rely upon it as a line of defense.
11293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
1s 331 U.S. 737 at 742, 67 S.Ct. 1489 (1947).
1 9 Ibid.
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Is the doctrine limited to situations in which all the stockholders
are treated alike? Here is room for elaboration. For one thing, sound
business motives are more likely to be present when there is diversity
of treatment. For instance, suppose some of the stockholders trade part
of their common stock for bonds as a step toward their retirement from
participation in the future affairs of the corporation. This is different
from the distribution of a dividend, as ordinarily conceived. The pro
rata participation of all stockholders of the same class, while not a sine
qua non, is usually an important characteristic of an ordinary dividend.
Standards along the lines .of those applied under section l 15(g) to
partial redemptions of stock seem appropriate here. In the given illustration, dividend treatment seems wholly inappropriate, even if the
group who get the bonds still retain some of their common, since, as a
general rule, one or more stockholders may sell their stock to the corporation and be taxed as the sellers of stock, not as the recipient of
dividends.
This was the position taken by the Tax Court in its post-Bazley
decision in Marjorie N. Dean. 20 However, in that case the common
was exchanged for preferred stock, rather than for bonds, so that it does
not meet our precise illustration. The purpose was to induce inactive
women to surrender voting stock, so that the voting power of individuals active in management would be increased. The Tax Court reapplied its business purpose test and held this to be a tax-free exchange.
From the attitude taken by the bureau during the past year, in
connection with advance rulings on projected transactions, there are
indications that it is sympathetic to this view. ·
Is the doctrine limited to the partial conversion of common stock
into corporate indebtedness? Recapitalization exchanges afford a wide
variety of transactions. To how many of these does the Bazley rule
apply? If there is a downstream exchange, i.e., the taxpayer moves from
a senior to a junior security, such as an exchange of bonds for preferred
stock, or of preferred stock for common stock, it would not seem proper
to invoke the new doctrine. The taxpayer is not segregating cash ot the
equivalent. He is moving in the opposite direction from any distribution. He is tied in closer than before to the corporation, and the value
of his new holdings will be the more subject to the varying fortunes of
the corporation in the future.
But what of the upstream exchange? Specifically, if part of the
common stock is exchanged for preferred sto~k, is this, for all practical
20

10 T.C. 19 (1948).

1952]

TAXING CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS

559

purposes, the equivalent of a cash distribution? As noted before, if and
when the preferred stock is redeemed, the stockholder must face the
tests of section llS(g). Cannot the question of dividend on the whole
amount, or capital gain on the actual profit, safely be left until that
time? Or is it desirable, as the Treasury seems t_o feel, to impose the
heavy burden of dividend taxation upon all taxpayers who make exchanges of this sort, because some of them may be laying the basis for
a sale of the preferred to a third party who may later obtain its redemption without serious danger of a dividend tax under section l 15(g)?21
Are distinctions to be drawn where the preferred stock is callable, or
where a sinking fund is contemplated or provided. The crystal ball is
our only recourse for answer to these questions at this time.
Suppose that preferred stock is exchanged for bonds. The taxpayer
is a step nearer to the cash in the corporate till, and section l 15(g) is
not, at least according to its literal terms, applicable to the payment of
bonds. But if they are trading a limited interest for another limited
interest of approximately equal value, say a share of $100 par value
preferred stock for a $100 bond, to hold that they have realized a $100
dividend, subject in full to normal tax and surtax, seems unjustifiably
harsh. 22 Will the answer lie in treating the bond as a distribution in
redemption of the stock and applying section 115 (g) or comparaQle
tests? Or will section l 12(c)(2) be applied, limiting the dividend to
the actual gain on the exchange, although this approach would do some
violence to the statute since no "recapitalization" qualifying as a reorganization under section l 12(g) may be involved? Will the manner
in which the preferred had previously been acquired be a deciding
factor, one result being reached where it was received as a stock dividend or in a prior recapitalization, presumably with a low basis, and the
opposite result where it was purchased or inherited, with a cost or other
basis approaching its par value? These questions likewise are not subject to answer at this time.
21 In a pre-Bazley decision, involving an exchange of part of the common stock for a
new preferred stock, used by the taxpayers to satisfy indebtedness incurred in purchasing
the common stock, the Tax Court held that a dividend was not involved. Although the
Court found that it was not a reorganization for want of a corporate business purpose, and
that, the form of an exchange having been followed, the transaction could not be treated
as a stock dividend, it treated it as a simple exchange, with no tax because the cost of the
common stock turned in exceeded the value of the preferred stock received. Nor was
§ll5(g) applicable because earnings had not been distributed. Louis Wellhouse, Jr., 3 T.C.
363 (1944).
.
22 In Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B.T.A. 578 (1937), reversed on other issues (5th Cir. 1939)
102 F. (2d) ll5, preferred stock was exchanged for bonds equal to the par value plus
dividends theretofore declared on the stock, plus a retirement premium. This was held a
nontaxable exchange to the extent of the bonds equaling the par value of the stock.
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The Supreme Court's own statement of its position, broad as it is
intended to be, refers only to a distribution of new corporate obligations. But the implications could apply to any upstream exchange. As
with past excursions of the Court into the reorganization provisions, we
are left with a great new field of uncertainty.
Whether or not we accept the Court's tacit assumption that such
uncertainty is a necessary consequence of the statute-and I for one do
not-I would expect few exponents of our economic system to deny
that it is unfortunate that heavy-often crippling-tax liabilities should
turn upon factors so vague that even the Court can define them only
in the most general terms.
Advance Bureau Rulings

What can the taxpayer do in the face of this uncertainty? If a past•
transaction is challenged-and we must recognize that the B,izley rule,
like other judge-made tax law, is fully retroactive-he can only argue
his case in conference or before the.courts to the best of his ability, in
the meantime attempting to accumulate a cash reserve to meet payment
if the tax should be sustained.
For prospective transactions, we can ask the bureau at Washington
for a ruling in advance of the transaction. If the facts are fully stated,
it may reasonably be anticipated that a favorable ruling will be followed,
even though the future may bring forth radical changes by the courts
in the law as it was interpreted at the time of the ruling. The bureau
has the power to disregard such a ruling,23 but as a general policy it
has the fairness and the good sense not to do so. Even the lingering fear
that the bureau might reverse its ruling after the transaction has been
completed can be dispelled by a closing agreement under section 3760,
in which event the agreement is final and conclusive, except upon a
showing of fraud or malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material
fact.
·
This course of procedure is not for the hasty taxpayer, for such
rulings may take a substantial time in the issuance, particularly if they
involve a borderline question. If a closing agreement is requested, still
further time will be required.
For a considerable period after the Bazley decision, the bureau
refused to issue any rulings on questions anywhere within rifle range
of its implications. But now, after considerable study, some policies
have been evolved, and rulings on some situations are issued with reasonable promptness, at least if the taxpayer's request is made sufficiently
28 Knapp-Monarch

Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 863.
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ahead of the year-end log jam. The bureau does not have to honor a
request for a ruling. Whether or not it acts at all is wholly within its
discretion. Naturally the bureau does not welcome the extra load of
issuing rulings on the many requests that have followed the Bazley
case, but on the whole we have found the bureau sympathetic to the
taxpayer's predicament and its attitude on specific questions reasonable
under all the circumstances. This course of procedure is likewise not
wholly satisfactory from the taxpayer's standpoint but it has seemed to
us the most practicable course in many recent situations.

Stock Dividends
Much of the foregoing discussion of recapitalization exchanges is
likewise applicable to stock dividends. They differ in form but not in
effect from many recapitalization exchanges. For instance, preferred
stock might be declared as a dividend on common stock, or common
stock might be exchanged for common and preferred stock. While stock
dividends do not enjoy the specific statutory protection of a recapitalization, certain types of stock dividends enjoy immunity under decisions
of the Supreme Court. While this protection is not as permanent as we
might desire, in view of the dissents each time the question has arisen
and of the changing complexion of the Court from time to time, nevertheless there does not yet appear to be any overt move to challenge the
Court's last guess on stock dividends.
But some hint of the bureau's present attitude may be gained from
inspecting rulings issued by it on prospective. declarations. For some
time most of these rulings have contained an express qualification that
the rule will be nugatory if the stock dividend is followed by a sale of
the new stock. Before the ruling is issued, the bureau may look closely
at such matters as the callability of preferred stock and the presence of
sinking fund provisions.
The underlying philosophy might be stated in this manner:
(1) A readjustment of the form of a business entity, or the individual's interest therein, should be freely permitted without a tax penalty, or even with a minimum recognition of any theoretical gain.
(2) But sales as well as dividends cannot be disguised under these
provisions. Hence, if an upstream exchange, or a comparable stock
dividend, is simply a step by the stockholder toward a salable interest,
enabling him to realize part of his investment in cash but still retaining
the same proportion of control and benefits attaching to common stock
ownership, he may be taxed, forthwith and heavily, at the first step.
Since this attitude reaches to cash realizations by sale, it is an extension
of the doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court.
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Other Reorganization Patterns: Reincorporation

Passing now to other major reorganization patterns, we can quickly
dispose of the reincorporation of an existing corporation. The pertinent
reorganization definition is found in section 112(g)(l)(F) or possibly
(D). As a matter of substance, we are not far from a recapitalization.
A new corporation is involved, but it is a complete successor to the old,
and is owned by the same interests except such as are retired in the
transaction.
The new corporation is likely to be formed under the laws of a
different state. In this or other details there may be business reasons
for the transaction, ranging from the substantial through the merely
plausible to the purely superficial. But unless the business purposes
were quite sound, I would not expect to escape the long arm of Bazley
by planning a reincorporation rather than a recapitalization if, as a part
of the transaction, the stockholders were converting part of their old
common stock into bonds of the new corporation.
For corporate accounting purposes, all that the new company receives from the old company will be capital or paid-in surplus. But this
does not provide a defense against dividend treatment. For purposes
of the Internal Revenue Code, a contrary principle of tax accounting
applies. By the so-called Sansome rule,2 4 invented by the courts and
not specified by any legislation but expressly taken into account in the
old and the new excess profits tax laws, the accumulated earnings of the
old company' retain their character as earnings in the hands of a successor corporation in a tax-free exchange under section 112. Hence,
boot received by the individual participants from the new company will
be taxable as a dividend if the old company had accumulated earnings
immediately before its succession by the new company.
Spin-offs, Split-offs, and Split-ups

The next type of reorganization involves the division of an existing
corporation into two or more entities. The same individuals retain
"control" of each entity, although they may part with a minor fraction
24 Commissioner v. Sansome, (2d Cir. 1932) 60 F. (2d) 931, cert. den. 287 U.S.
667, 53 S.Ct. 291 (1932); United States v. Kauffmann, (9th Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d)
1045; Murchison's Estate v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 641; Baker v.
Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1936) 80 F. (2d) 813; Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U.S. 210,
67 S.Ct. 1175 (1947); Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949);
Robinette v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 513; Putnam v. United States,
(1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 721; Estate of Howard H. McClintic, 47 B.T.A. 188 (1942),
remanded per compromise, 43-2 U.S.T.C. 119599; National Sanitaiy Co., 6 T.C. 166
(1946), remanded on another issue; Stella K. Mandel, 5 T.C. 684 (1945).
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of their interests. This may be accomplished by any of several procedures, for which the curr~ntly popular names are the spin-off, split-off,
or split-up.
A spin-off occurs when A company transfers part of its assets to B
company for stock of B company which is then distributed to the A
company stockholders, who also retain all their original holdings in A
company.
From 1924 through 1933, this would have been a tax-free reorganization distribution to the A company stockholders. It was made so in
the 1924 act for the express reason that this same result could have
been accomplished by a more roundabout procedure.25
But since the 1934 act, form has been fatal to this transaction. Step
l is a tax-free exchange as to A company but step 2 is simply a distribution by A company to its stockholders, no different from a distribution of cash or any other property. There is no exchange by the stockholders to bring them within section l 12(b)(3). If A company has
earnings, they have received an ordinary dividend under section
ll5(a).25a
How does the Sansome rule of inherited earnings apply here as
between A company and B company? It is a judge-made rule, developed and extended or limited as each new case arises, so that it does not
have even the apparent precision of a statutory rule. But here I think
it is clear that if A company has earnings immediately before this transaction, there will be a dividend, to that extent, when the B company
stock is distributed to the A company stockholders. Since no gain or
loss is recognized to A company when it creates B company, there is no
!?5 Section 203(c), Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926; §ll2(g), Revenue Acts of 1928
and 1932. The 1924 Ways and Means Committee report stated:
''There is no provision of the existing law which corresponds to subdivision (c).
Under the existing law, if corporation A organizes a subsidiary, corporation B, to which
it transfers part of its assets in exchange for all the stock of corporation B, and distributes
the stock of corporation B as a dividend to its stockholders without the surrender by the
stockholders of any of their stock, then such a dividend is a taxable one. If, however, corporation A organizes two new corporations, corporations B and C, and transfers part of its
assets to corporation B and part to corporation C, and the stockholders of corporation A
surrender their stock and receive in exchange therefor stock of corporations B and C, no
gain from the transaction is recognized. Thus, under the existing law, the same result,
except as to tax liability, may be obtained by either of two methods; but if the first method
set out above is adopted, the gain is taxable, while if the second method set out above is
adopted, there is no taxable gain. Subdivision (c) of the bill permits the reorganization to
be accomplished in the first manner set out above without the recognition of gain. This
method represents a common type of reorganization and clearly should be included within
the reorganization provisions of the statute as long as the exemption under the present law
is continued." H. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st sess., p. 14. The Finance Committee
made a similar statement. S. Rep. No. 398, p. 15.
25a Since this paper was prepared, the Revenue Act of 1951 has added §ll2(b)(ll)
specifically authorizing certain spin-offs.
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diminution of its pre-existing earnings by that step. And if, as part of
the same transaction, there is a distribution of the A company earnings
to its stockholders, these same earnings should not at the same time be
inherited by B company. The Sansome rule is not founded upon the
continuity of the enterprise, but is designed purely to prevent tax
avoidance. 26 Hence it would not be applied to diminish the A company earnings and enable the A company stockholders to receive a taxfree distribution of the B company stock.27
A split-off is similar to a spin-off except that the A company stockholders turn in part of their stock to A company in exchange for the B
company stock. Both steps of this transaction are within the precise
language of section 112. The transfer by A company of part of its
assets to B company for stock of B company is not only a transfer to a
controlled corporation under section 112(b)(5), but is also a reorganization exchange under section l 12(b)(4), there being a reorganization
under section I 12(g)(l)(D) if, immediately after the transfer, A
company or its stockholders or both are in control of B company. B
company need not be a new corporation, so long as the control requirement is satisfied. It can be an existing corporation already controlled
by the A company stockholders, or it might be an existing corporation
wholly owned by other parties, if the assets coming to it from A company justify the issue of enough additional stock to put A company or
its stockholders into control. Likewise, independent interests might
acquire a part of the B company stock if this was not sufficient to prevent control by A·company or its stockholders.
Step 2 is an exchange by the A company stockholders of part of
their A company stock for stock of B company within the language
of section l 12(b)(3). Although it is also a partial liquidation by A
company, it is still to be treated as an exchange by the express provision
of section II5(c).
A split-up, the third variation, involves two or more successor corporations, which acquire all of the A company assets and issue their stock
to A company, which is then completely dissolved. Here again each
step is a reorganization exchange under section I 12(b)(3) and ( 4).
In practice, the more cumbersome method of the split-up may be the
preferable alternative. There appears to be some tendency in official
quarters to treat the split-off as a spin-off, as a means of supporting an
26Commissioner v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1949).
27 By the same reasoning, if the A company stockholders receive a taxable dividend,
there is no tax avoidance and no occasion to hold that the same earnings are inherited by
B company. Samuel L. Slover, 6 T.C. 884 (1946).
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assertion that the distribution of the B company stock to the A company stockholders is an ordinary dividend. There is at least some psychological barrier to this attitude in the case of a split-up, since, where the
A company stockholders receive stocks of two new companies, it may
be difficult to say which of the new stocks stands in the place of the old
and which represents the dividend or other ·distribution.
Whichever procedure is adopted, the individual stockholders face
the same gamut of questions that arise in the case of a recapitalization
or reincorporation. Full compliance with section 112 is necessary in
order that there be a reorganization exchange under section l 12(b)(3).
If boot is involved, the stockholders may be taxed upon ordinary dividends under section l 12(c)(2). This is true whether the source of
the boot is the retained assets of A company, or a return of part of the
assets of B company, or assets previously owned by B company, if it
was an existing company, or short-term obligations of B company given
as part of the consideration for the assets but which cannot qualify as
"securities."
Finally, the Bazley doctrine cannot be disregarded. If, for instance,
as part of such a transaction, the stockholders were to attempt to convert
part of their old A company common stock into bonds of B company,
this would probably be seized upon as a taxable dividend. All the
uncertainties attending any upstream, exchange are present in these
cases; for instance, the conversion of A company common stock into
B company preferred stock, or of A company preferred stock into B
company bonds.
The Acquisition of One Corporation by Another

Finally, we come to the case in which there is a true succession of
one corporation by another, i.e., the acquiring company is an existing
corporation into which the interests in the old company are merged.
This transaction may take the form of an acquisition of 80 per cent or
more of the A company stock by B company, or the acquisition of substantially all of the A company assets by B company. The pertinent
reorganization definitions are found in section l 12(g)(l)(B) and (C).
Each of these definitions requires that the acquisition by B company
must be solely for voting stock of B company. Hence the question of
whether the transaction qualifies as a reorganization is likely to be of
much more importance in these cases than in the types of reorganization
heretofore considered.
A third possible form of these transactions is the statutory merger
or consolidation, which is a reorganization under section l 12(g)(l)
(A). Here there is no statutory limitation upon the issue of nonvoting
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stock or obligations of B company to the A company stockholders.· So
with a statutory merger or consolidation, it will be possible for B company to pay some boot to the A company stockholders, without precluding classification of the transaction as a reorganization. But if
there is any boot, the stockholders must face tax upon the receipt of a
dividend, for if distribution of the boot has the effect of a dividend, the
automatic rule of section 112(c)(2) comes into play. For this purpose, in considering whether there are corporate earnings available for
distribution, it would seem appropriate to look to the earnings of either
A company or B company.
It follows that in all of these cases where one existing corporation
absorbs another, any boot_ passing to the stockholders is virtually precluded if a tax-free exchange is desired. It may also be noted that
these comments apply to the B company stockholders as well as to the
A company stockholders.
In addition to true boot, the implications of the Bazley doctrine must
also be considered in these cases. While the acquisition of one corporation by another will, in most instances, be amply supported by sound
business purposes, the argument is always possible that, to the extent
an upstream exchange was involved, it was not essential to the accomplishment of these business purposes, but was an added feature that
may be judged and taxed as a separate issue.
All of these problems are aggravated in many of these absorption
cases by the presence of unwanted assets, that is, a part of the assets
of A company that are not desired by B company, or which the A company stockholders wish to retain for themselves. Or perhaps A company may be willing to merge its interests with B company, only if
some of the B company assets have first been segregated for the B
company stockholders alone. Discussion of the multiplicity of possibilities that can arise,· and of possible or plausible solutions, could alone
take the entire time allotted to me. Hence this must be deferred for
some other occasion. In the simpler situations that have been considered in some detail, there are ample problems, complexities and uncertainties for the time being.
I regret that this is so, and that I have raised more questions than
I can answer. But I expect this haze of uncertainty to continue so long
as the courts continue to hold that plain language in the statute cannot
be taken at face value and is subject to restrictions and qualifications
that can only dimly be foreseen, and that every transaction in the nature
of a reorganization may be second-guessed by the bureau and the courts
in the light of such qualifications as they develop, and so long as Congress continues to acquiesce in this attitude.

